period of what was an essentially negative or at least neutral attitude toward modern democracy there were those who argued the fourth position and they were ultimately triumphant in the Second Vatican Council. In doing so, they were able to point to certain elements in the Catholic tradition which were congruent with, indeed contributory to, the development of democratic values and institutions. These were important arguments in a church in which tradition was one of the bases for doctrine, and that tradition contained not one, but a number of different implications for political practice. I would like to summarize the components of that tradition as they developed in three different historical periods that antedated the emergence of modern democracy and provided elements for the Catholic response.
THE BIBLE AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EARLY CHURCH
The historical debate on the political meaning of the New Testament has focused on a number of biblical passages. Christ's response to the question of the legitimacy of the payment of taxes to Rome, "Render to Caesar, the things that are Caesar's, and to God, the things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21), has been the source of a considerable literature on the relations of the spiritual and the temporal. It introduced an element of dualism into Christian political thinking which in its Catholic institutional expression led to the establishment of a separate institutional structure, the church, that was not, as nearly all earlier religious institutions had been, a part of the ethnic or political structure of existing communities. That separate structure soon felt the need for authoritative definition of dogma and membership, but the evidence seems to indicate the structure of church authority involved several different forms of church government. Peter and his successors were understood to have received a special commission from Christ, "Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my church" (Matthew 16:18), but the apostles and their successors, the bishops, were also given a universal mission by Christ ("Going therefore teach ye all nations" Matthew 28:19), and the early Christian communities were also seen as recipients of divine grace and inspiration ("Where two or three are gathered together in My name there am I in the midst of them" Matthew 18:20) and acted as communities to make decisions about common affairs, becoming almost independent self-governing entities in 532 CATHOLIC TRADITION AND DEMOCRACY 533 periods of persecution.1 Thus the government of the early church partook of elements of all three of the classic forms, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, and when later Christians looked back to it as a model they could find all three elements within it.
A similar ambiguity could be found in two New Testament texts concerned with political obligation. Paul's Letter to the Romans advises, "Let every soul be subject to higher powers. For there is no power but of God. The powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God" (Romans 13:1-2), but when Peter was called before the Sanhedrin and forbidden to preach, he replied, "We must obey God rather than men" (Acts 5:29). Political obligation was religiously based, but it was limited by a higher religious duty. The appropriate Christian response in cases of conflict between the two was to be a continuing subject of controversy.
MEDIEVAL THEORY AND PRACTICE
When the Christian message was expressed in philosophical terms by the Fathers of the Church the fusion of Christianity and classical culture included the adoption by many Christian writers of the neoPlatonic hierarchical models, especially as mediated through the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite.2 Hierarchy in theory was reinforced by hierarchy in practice as the Western Church was organized in a centralized hierarchical way under the papacy in the later Middle Ages, and feudal theory and practice conceived of medieval political and social life in terms of ranks and orders. Theorists such as John of Salisbury (1120-1180) employed classical organic analogies to describe the organization of society along lines that paralleled the structure of the human body, and medieval lawyers used such analogies to describe the organization and legal status of the emerging "corporate" groups, guilds, religious orders, etc.
On the other hand there were also more democratic elements in the medieval tradition. Law and government were seen as emerging from the people and justified by their consent (in the sense of consensus). Authority was limited by customary and natural law, as well as by a confused network of judicial bodies and authorities. In the church-state conflicts between the spiritual and temporal powers, each side appealed to the role of people to weaken the claims of the other side, and in the constitutional crises of the church associated with the Conciliar Movement conciliar writers used both aristocratic ("episcopalist") and democratic (the tradition of election of bishops and of the pope) arguments to limit papalist claims.3
The combination of hierarchical (in Walter Ullmann's terms, "descending") and democratic ("ascending") elements in medieval political thought is illustrated in the political writings of Thomas Aquinas. On the one hand, law is made by "the whole community or the person who represents it" (S.T I-II. q. 90. art.3) and the best form of government is one in which "all participate in the election of those who rule" (S. T I-II. q. 105), but on the other, government by a monarch is best because it promotes unity and follows the pattern of divine monarchical government of the universe (De Regimine Principum, chap. 3). The pope leads the church to a higher spiritual goal of man, but (at least in one interpretation of Aquinas) can only intervene in temporal affairs "with respect to those things in which the temporal power is subject to him" (S. T II-II. q. 60 art. 6). Law is morally obligatory and reflects the divine purposes in the world, but an unjust law that violates natural or divine law is no law at all, but an act of violence (S.T. I-II. q. 96. art. 2). All men are equal in the sight of God and even slaves have rights, but "there is an order to be found among men" according to which even before the Fall the more intelligent are to lead the less intelligent (Summa Contra Gentiles, 4. 81; and S.T I. q. 92. art. 3-4).4 Authoritarian, constitutionalist (St. Thomas as "the first Whig"), and democratic conclusions can be drawn from Aquinas's writings.
THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION AND THE RISE OF THE MODERN STATE
The ambiguities of medieval thought were made less ambiguous by the reaction of the papacy in the early modern period to the Reformation and the rise of the absolute monarchs. While religious pluralism and the claims of conscience led Protestant writers such as Milton and Locke to argue for religious toleration, the popes preferred to centralize dogma and discipline and to deal with the absolute monarchs through concordats (i.e., treaties), that guaranteed the rights of the church, including religious uniformity and financial support, and special rights in the areas of education and marriage. The "descending" thesis was applied unambiguously to the papacy, but its temporal counterpart, the "divine right of kings" as enunciated by James I, was rejected in favor of "ascending" theories put forward by Jesuit writers such as Robert Bellarmine and Francisco Suarez on the derivation of political authority from God 534 CATHOLIC TRADITION AND DEMOCRACY 535 through the people. There were debates as to whether the transfer of authority from the people to the ruler was an irrevocable one, and those who argued for a conditional transfer made important contributions to the constitutional tradition that was later developed by the Puritans and Locke. However, while there were moral and constitutional limits on his rule, the Catholic writers endorsed the rule of the monarch, who, while he did not rule by unlimited divine right, received his authority through an implicit or explicit grant from the people ultimately from God.
Thus by the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Catholic church in Western Europe was the state church in the principalities and kingdoms of southern and central Europe and Protestantism had a similar position in northern Europe. The union of throne and altar allied the interests of Catholicism closely to those of the absolute monarchs, and gave them considerable control over the churches in their territories, especially through the right of "patronage," naming bishops in cooperation with the Vatican either directly, or by selecting a candidate from a list, or at least vetoing unacceptable nominees.
This comfortable but corrupting arrangement was threatened in both theory and practice by the philosophies and political movements of the Enlightenment. "Ecrazez l'infame" exclaimed Voltaire, and Rousseau's Social Contract proposed a compulsory civil religion according to which loyalty to the General Will was to replace a Catholicism that divided the allegiances of its adherents. The French Revolution swept away the privileges of the church, and forced its priests to swear to a Civil Constitution of the Clergy (1792). In the early nineteenth century Napoleon and later the restored Bourbons reestablished the alliance of the church with the forces of order, authority, and dynastic legitimacy. In France two great spiritual political families, monarchists and republicans, entered into a struggle for power that dominated nineteenth-century French politics, and the church was clearly identified with the monarchy. Similarly in Italy and in Spain the liberal movement attacked the privileges of the church, and in Italy the Papal States that divided Italy diagonally from just north of Naples to just south of Venice provided a ready target for Italian nationalists. The church was placed in a defensive position against a rising tide of liberalism, nationalism, and revolution, and all three were linked to popular sovereignty.
A combination of territorial and institutional interests and a concern to defend the spiritual values represented by the church led THE REVIEW OF POLITICS the nineteenth-century popes to issue the famous denunciations of liberal democracy which were later so frequently quoted by Paul Blanshard and others who viewed the rising influence of Catholicism in the twentieth century as a threat to American freedom. Among those popes were:
(a) Gregory XVI (1831-1846). When efforts were made in France under the leadership of the Abbe Felicite de Lamennais through his journal, L'Avenir, to persuade the church to align itself with democracy and popular sovereignty, Gregory reacted with Mirari Vos (1832), a strongly worded encyclical that condemned the "absurd and erroneous proposition which claims that liberty of conscience must be maintained for everyone" along with "that harmful and never sufficiently denounced freedom to publish any writings whatsoever and disseminate them to the people." The pope called for "action to destroy the plague of bad books" and recommended "trust and submission to princes" denouncing those who "consumed with the unbridled lust for freedom, are entirely devoted to impairing and destroying all rights of dominion while bringing servitude to the people under the slogan of liberty" and attempting "to separate the Church from the state and to break the mutual concord between temporal authority and the priesthood."
Gregory's intemperate words were written in reaction to a revolution in the Papal States which he had suppressed with the help of Austrian troops, but it set the tone for papal statements for much of the rest of the century. Those who attempted to derive democratic conclusions from the Catholic tradition were to be fighting an uphill battle for the rest of the century, and indeed into the early twentieth century.5 (b) Pius IX (1846-1878). As is well known, Pius began his pontificate with considerable sympathy for the liberal movement, but the revolution that drove him out of Rome from 1848 until 1850 changed his attitude. In 1864 he published two important documents relating to liberalism and democracy. His encyclical, Quanta Cura, condemned those who assert that "that is the best condition of civil society in which no duty is recognized as attached to the civil power, of restraining, by enacting penalties, offenders against the Catholic religion." He quoted Gregory XVI who had described liberty of conscience as "an insanity" and freedom of speech as "injurious babbling." 
